Over the past two decades, earnings from farming in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been altered hugely by government sectoral and trade policy reforms. This paper summarizes evidence on the changing extent of distortions to markets for farm products since the transition away from planned prices began. In particular, it examines the extent to which, following the initial shocks, there has been a gradual improvement in farmer incentives. This new evidence is not inconsistent with that past pattern of earlier-developing countries, but the speed of assistance increase is relatively rapid and is linked with actual or desired accession to the European Union. The final section focuses on future prospects, and in particular on what might be done to avoid agricultural protection levels becoming excessive.
Introduction
In a recent survey of European economic growth since 1950, Crafts and Toniolo (2008) conclude that incentive structures are a crucial explanator of comparative growth rates of the economies of east and west Europe. Pre-empting that, a 2006 report on trade performance and policies in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia included as one of its key recommendations the need to reduce the mean and variance of the tariff equivalents of trade barriers, and in particular to reduce unilaterally the policy regimes' anti-export bias, especially in countries exporting primary products (Broadman 2006) . To progress such reform in Europe's transition economies efficiently and effectively -and to see how recent policies line up with those of the European Union (EU) -requires better information on the extent of reform during the past two decades and of current policy influences on incentives within and between sectors.
Immediately prior to their transition to market economies, policies in the region greatly distorted producer and consumer incentives, especially for agricultural products.
Those distortions have been reduced substantially in several countries, but large variations remain across the region and distortions appear to be growing again in some countries. Now is thus an opportune time to examine how policies affecting agriculture are evolving in this region. economic forces behind their evolution. The paper also explores prospects for further reducing distortions to agricultural incentives and their implications for agricultural competitiveness and trade of the different transition countries, taking into account political economy factors behind the distortions to agricultural incentives in transition countries.
An Historical Perspective

a. The Communist era
Incentives for agricultural producers and food consumers were massively distorted under Communist central planning, which was imposed from the 1920s in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and from the 1950s in Central and Eastern Europe until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991. The distortions resulted from a combination of collective farm property rights, centrally controlled organization of production allocation, processing, input provision and marketing, as well as the setting of prices unrelated to demand-supply conditions (leading to rationing), and state controlled trading and exchange rate systems. Land and farms were put under central planning and in most countries (with the exception of Poland and former Yugoslavia) farming was forcefully organized in collective and state farms. This collectivization process and the associated forced migration (and worse) of many landowners and farmers contributed to massive hunger and death before the Second World War in the Soviet Union. From Lenin to Stalin and through most of Khrushchev's regime, agriculture was heavily taxed, and capital was drained from an impoverished countryside to finance urban industrial growth (Ellman 1988). 2 This all changed at the end of the Khruschev regime and especially under Brezhnev.
The leadership of the USSR decided to increase agricultural production, with a strong 2 The dramatic implications -including millions of peasants dying of starvation -are documented in sobering detail in Conquest (1986) . emphasis on livestock, and this was a policy also followed by many of the Eastern European countries of the Soviet Bloc (Liefert and Swinnen 2002) . From the mid-1950s onwards, and especially in the 1970s and 1980s, large amounts of support and investment were directed to agriculture. By 1980, almost 30 percent of total Soviet investment was going into agriculture (Gray 1990) . At the same time, consumer prices were set low and producer prices high, with the gap covered by direct subsidies to processing and trading companies or by soft budget constraints. Consequently, from 1970 to 1990 livestock herds and output in these countries grew by between 40 and 60 percent. The rise in feed requirements for the growing herds stimulated the crop sector. In the late 1980s, the average annual output of feed grain in Poland and Hungary was up by half and one-quarter, respectively, compared with output in the late 1960s. In the USSR the feed requirements were so great that the country also became a substantial importer of feed commodities.
By 1990, per capita consumption of livestock products and foodstuffs in general compared favorably with many OECD countries, even though per capita incomes in Central and East Europe were much lower than the OECD average. This "achievement" came at a cost: large state subsidies, to both producers and consumers, were necessary to maintain the high levels of production and consumption. For example, by the end of the 1980s, direct budgetary subsidies to the agriculture and food economy were about 10 percent of GDP in the USSR and between 5 and 10 percent of GDP in most CEE countries. The bulk of these subsidies went to the livestock sector. Calculating the net transfers to farmers and to consumers under the Communist regime is very difficult because of the large number of distortions caused by state regulation of prices, production and consumption, exchange rates, marketing organizations, the indirect nature of some of the subsidies, and so forth. While it is generally true that producers of farm products were strongly subsidized by price settings towards the end of the Communist regime (in sharp contrast to the 1930s when farmers were highly discriminated against), the complexity of the distortions led sometimes to offsetting effects. For example, while agricultural producers in the latter 1980s were supported through high output prices and low input prices, at the same time overvalued exchange rates effectively taxed agricultural (and other) exporters. Correcting for this overvaluation leads to significantly lower protection indicators. As well, agriculture was not alone in being subsidized, as most (heavy) industry was also subsidized or at least protected from import competition. The available fragments of empirical evidence indicate that, on aggregate and in real terms, there was substantial net subsidization of agriculture relative to all other sectors as a group, although much more so for livestock producers than for grain and oilseed farmers. This might suggest food consumers were taxed substantially, but under the central planning system wholesalers were told to sell their food to retailers below their production costs, for which they received state subsidies. As well, with overvalued exchange rates effectively taxing exports and subsidizing imports, they too lowered domestic consumer prices of tradable products. However, by restricting foreign imports and regulating trade, the Communist regime prevented its consumers from accessing higher-quality food products. Kostova Huffman and Johnson (2004) estimate that these welfare losses were equivalent to 50 percent to 75 percent of the direct subsidy benefits to consumers under the communist regime.
b. The reform era
After 1989, the Central European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, moved first and most rapidly towards market-based systems. The reforms in the Balkan countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, were initially half-hearted and involved many inconsistencies during most of the 1990s, with government interventions continuing to heavily distort incentives. In the large CIS countries (Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), governments continued important controls of the agricultural economy through a variety of interventions such as regional trade controls, input supply controls, and the continuation of soft budget constraints. While the Kyrgyz Republic liberalized relatively quickly, the other Central Asian countries moved slower and some have undertaken far less reform and liberalization. In particular, major controls still remain in place in such countries as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
International trade had been strongly regulated under the centrally planned system. The Communist countries were integrated in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) system, which was a planned inter-country trading regime, trading mainly with other communist countries. (One could think of the CMEA as the international version of the domestic central planner.) The CEE countries were less integrated than the Soviet republics, but still a large part of their trade volume went through the CMEA system. When the CMEA system collapsed in the early 1990s with the liberalization of the macro-economy and of trade policies, important changes in trade and financial flows resulted. Trade liberalization reinforced the reallocation of production activities caused by the abolishment of central planning. Traditional international production allocations were no longer possible when trade had to be financed by hard currencies and when inputs were accounted for at real costs. It also allowed the importation of high-quality Western produce which had earlier been restricted. At the same time, the liberalization of the exchange rates removed discrimination against the sectors producing tradables.
Trade liberalization led to a major international reorganization of production activities. Initially this had a very negative impact on the region's producers, as the traditional export markets dwindled due to a lack of hard currency and because Western countries remained closed to the region's agricultural exports. At the same time, the reduction of import constraints opened regional markets to imports from the West. In combination, this caused a worsening of the region's agricultural trade balance in the first half of the 1990s.
Later on, however, agri-food trade intensified and growing exports (also to Western markets) contributed to the region's recovery. An important development was the shift from centrally imposed extreme specialization (e.g., dairy production in the Baltics and cotton production in Central Asia) to more-diversified production systems and less dependence on single commodities in those countries.
Trade effects were only part of the international effects in the agri-food systems.
Possibly even more important was the massive inflow of foreign direct investment to food processing industries, which contributed to a major restructuring and to improvements in food quality and productivity enhancements and investments in agriculture . Most recently, the wave of foreign investments in the retail sector caused further restructurings of the agri-food system, with important implications for both producers and consumers (Dries, Reardon and Swinnen 2004) .
The progress in market reforms is not always correlated with the extent of distortions.
On the one hand Slovenia, which was a front runner in liberalization and developing a market economy, had a very high level of farm producer support that, prior to EU accession, was well above the average EU15 rate. On the other hand, much-slower reformers such as Bulgaria, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have much lower -even negative -support levels (see below).
c. Growth and structural changes during transition
Before measuring the effect of the policy changes, and to put the sectoral changes in a broader perspective, it is also helpful to review the economic growth and intersectoral changes that have taken place in Europe's various transition economies over the past two decades. The initial years of transition from central planning to a more market-based economy saw production fall in the majority of sectors, before it recovered at varying rates from the mid-1990s. Real GDP for the region as a whole fell by almost 6 percent per year during 1990-94. The decline for the central and eastern European (CEE) sample was only 0.6 percent, while for the CIS sample it was 11 percent and, for the residual non-studies countries of the CIS, 12 percent. By contrast, annual GDP growth in the 1995-2004 period averaged 2.7 percent: the CIS sample was slowest (2.2 percent), the CEE countries somewhat higher at 3.2 percent, and the residual enjoyed just over 5 percent.
Within those economies, agricultural value added measured at constant prices appears to have declined less rapidly than non-agricultural GDP in the early years of transition, but also to have grown less rapidly in the subsequent decade. The domestic terms of trade (the prices of outputs relative to the prices of purchased inputs) apparently fell even more for farmers than for non-farmers, however, because agriculture's share of GDP measured in current prices declined even in the early transition period. Unlike in the central planning period, this did not allow faster industrialization but rather an expansion in the services sector, which increased from less than half the economy prior to 1993 to two-thirds by 2004. 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives During Transition
a. Methodology: Quantifying distortions to incentives
To quantify government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets, suggest the first step is to compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product. This is the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government's intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). A weighted average NRA for all covered products can then be derived using the value of production at undistorted prices as weights. This NRA is similar to the producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (various years), except that the latter are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price. 5 To that NRA for covered products is added a 'guesstimate' of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 pecent of the total) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation.
Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable farm products. We also generate a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), defined as:
where NRAag t and NRAnonag t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 6 Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since the weighted average NRAnonag t is non-negative in all our country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country's sectoral policy regime has an anti-(pro-)agricultural bias.
This approach is not well suited to analysis of the policies of Europe's former socialist economies prior to their reform era, because prices then played only an accounting function and currency exchange rates were enormously distorted. During their reform era, however, the price comparison approach provides as valuable a set of indicators for them as for other market economies of distortions to incentives for farm production, consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated with interventions.
6 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables.
In addition to the NRA, we also consider the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is computed as the percentage by which the price that consumers pay for their food exceeds the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions, and the CTE for nontradable farm products is assumed to be zero.
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, that multi-country study takes the country authors' NRA estimates and multiplies them by the gross value of production at undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to farmers (GSE). These GSE values are calculated in constant (2000) US dollars, and are also expressed on per-farm-worker basis. Likewise a value of the consumer transfer is derived from the CTE, by assuming the consumption value is the gross value of production at undistorted prices divided by the self-sufficiency ratio for each product (production divided by consumption, derived from national volume data or the FAO's commodity balance sheets). These transfer values can be added up across products for a country, and across countries for any or all products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied economies.
We also report trade and welfare reduction indexes (TRIs and WRIs, respectively) as The worst of the exchange rate distortions in the formerly planned economies were removed in the early 1990s, prior to the start of the period under study here. Since there were no reliable indicators of any remaining secondary market price for foreign currency, we made use of official exchange rates in undertaking price comparisons. 7 Our approach in this respect is consistent with that of, among others, the OECD Secretariat's calculations of agricultural producer support estimates (PSEs) (OECD, various years).
8 b. Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 7 For a detailed discussion of how misaligenments in the exchange rate may affect the measurement and interpretation of NRAs during transition, see Liefert and Liefert (2008) on Russia. 8 Nor was it possible to estimate the sectoral assistance equivalent of soft credits provided for some farms (and other enterprises). And throughout there has been no attempt to assess whether some interventions may have been warranted on national economic welfare grounds because of the presence of externalities, or failures in the markets for such things as land and credit, or policy failures such as underinvestment in public infrastructure in rural areas. In addition to the present study's estimation of price wedges, the latter would require a sophisticated economic model of the national economy with some quantification of the difference between private and social marginal costs. Such welfare analysis is thus beyond the scope of the present study.
Beginning in the early 1990s, many trade and price distortions were removed throughout the region. Price, exchange rate and trade policies were all liberalized, subsidies were cut, hard budget constraints were introduced, property rights were privatized, and production decisions were shifted to companies and households. One consequence was that, on average, support to agriculture fell to very low levels in the early 1990s (as it did also for industrial production).
Between 1992 and 1995, nominal assistance to agriculture averaged just 12 percent in the CEEC-10 and was below zero in Bulgaria and the three Baltic nations -as it was in Russia and Ukraine ( figure 1 and table 2 ).
The changes in policies and hence in rates of agricultural assistance since 1995 have not been smooth, but rather characterized by stop-go phases and sometimes even reversals of previous reforms, as is apparent from figure 1. Despite that heterogeneity of experiences, one can identify a couple of general phases in the policy changes.
Following its initial collapse, support to agriculture increased during the mid-1990s in some of the region's countries. In the CEE countries this was driven by the explicit introduction of new support policies, while in Russia it reflected primarily exchange rate developments which, in the presence of institutional constraints which constrained the passthrough of border prices to farm-gate prices, pushed assistance rates up to high levels. There are major differences in distortions across commodities too. In the 1980s virtually all commodities were supported, albeit some more than others. With transition the variation has remained, but in the CIS some commodities are now taxed (table 3) . For example, by 2000-03, sugar, poultry and milk were the most highly protected commodities in the CEEC-10, and grains, beef and pork were the least assisted. Meanwhile, in Russia and Ukraine the range is even more extreme, from high positive assistance to livestock and sugar to high negative assistance to the production of the key feed inputs into livestock (coarse grains and oilseeds). It happens that sunflower seed is Russia's dominantly produced and traded oilseed and the only consistently exported commodity through the transition period.
The case of Kazakhstan in 2004 was even starker, where import-competing producers were highly assisted while exporting industries had to endure negative assistance such that, even though the average NRA was close to zero, a strong anti-agricultural trade bias prevailed.
Government intervention and controls are especially important in a few key commodities within each country, often because of (real or imagined) food security concerns or the need to raise government revenue to meet other priorities. This is, for example, the case for grains and oilseeds in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Russia, both for human consumption and to support (via low feed input prices) the production of livestock products. It has been true also for cotton in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where heavy taxation is distorting incentives for producers -although open or porous borders make the taxing of cotton exports difficult while tax rates vary across countries in that sub-region. Water price regulations and subsidies are important policy instruments in the irrigated regions of Central Asia, but it was not possible in this study to estimate their impact on NRAs. Energy policies are still used to assist various sectors, for example in Russia, but since they do not favor agriculture in particular, and are becoming less important, they too have been omitted from our NRA estimates.
compares with $8400 per farmer in the EU-15 in 2000-04 (Josling 2008) . For the EU accedents, per farmer assistance over the next few years is likely to move closer to the EU average.
c. Effects on consumers
Since most of the support for farmers came through price-support measures, most notably import restrictions, these have the effect of raising consumer prices by a similar degree when calculated at the farmgate. That means that prior to the mid-1990s, policies in all but Slovenia imposed the equivalent of low or negative taxes on food consumers (CTEs), but thereafter the CTEs have become positive. The region's weighted average CTE in 2000-03 was 15 percent (table 6) , compared with nearly twice that in the EU-15. The high CTEs in Romania and Slovenia have been well above that EU average this decade and so presumably will fall during those countries' transition to the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, especially given the EU's policy re-instrumentation towards more direct farm income supports that do not raise consumer prices of food.
d. Effects on trade and welfare
Additional insights that can be gained in moving from an average NRA and CTE measure to a TRI and WRI measure. The WRI provides a better indicator of the welfare cost of distortions than the average level of assistance or taxation in the Agricultural Distortions database. Although the latter are a significant contribution in their own right, they can be misleading as a pair of indicators of the extent of the welfare costs of assistance or taxation.
This is due to the inclusion in the WRI of the 'power of two'. That is, a weighted arithmetic mean NRA and CTE do not fully reflect the welfare effects of agricultural distortions because the dispersion of that support or taxation across products has been ignored. By contrast, the WRI captures the higher welfare costs of high and peak levels of assistance or taxation. The WRI series for Eatsern European countries is everywhere positive, and lies above the NRA series (figure 3) owing to its capturing of the dispersion of the NRA. That is, the WRI captures the so-called 'disparity' issue discussed in Lloyd (1974) : the larger the variance in assistance levels within a sector, the greater the potential for resources to be used in activities which do not maximize economic welfare.
The TRI correctly aggregates the restrictiveness of sub-sector policies that are masked in aggregate NRA and CTE measures, because they offset one another. In figure 4 , for example, initially the TRI for the Eastern European focus countries is negative. This was the period in which import-competing policies had the overall effect of expanding trade. Over time, however, policies in import-competing sectors increasingly restricted trade flows, with a peak TRI of 35 in 1997 when Eastern Europe's economies, on average, had policies in place which reduced overall trade in the agricultural sector to the same amount as a tariff of 35 percent on each product. After 1997, both import-competing and exportable sectors had policies that expanded trade. In the most recent years, the overall effect of policies in the import-competing and exportables sub-sector on trade is neutral (table 7) . However, as can be seen in figure 5, this overall result masks the trade-reducing nature of policies in importcompeting sectors and the trade-expanding nature of policies in exportable product sectors.
e. Assistance to agriculture relative to other tradable sectors
The region's import tariffs on primary agricultural commodities are on average twice as high as average tariffs in industry, but only half as high as tariffs on processed food. This is true both for the CEECs and for CIS countries. It suggests that while the region's farmers receive 10 Such differences in distortions among different types of agricultural industries make it difficult to generalize about the impact of overall policy reforms on income inequality within and between countries of the region. They also suggest that using a single variable to represent trade reform in regression analyses aimed at assessing reform's impact on inequality, as in Milanovic and Ersado (2008) , may be too simplistic. more tariff protection from competition abroad than do non-agricultural producers, food processors may be effectively protected despite having to pay above world prices for primary farm products.
The import-competing producers are only part of each sector, however. When account also is taken of support for producers of exports in each sector, an overall NRA for all nonagricultural tradable industries can be used, together with the average NRA for agricultural tradable industries, to calculate the relative rate of assistance (RRA). In so far as the NRAs for non-farm industries are positive, the RRA is lower than the NRA for agriculture. But in most cases the nonagricultural NRA is very low. Thus the overall NRA for tradable primary agriculture in the region during 2000-03 is estimated to have averaged more than three times higher than for producers of non-agricultural tradables (15 as compared with 5 percent), so the RRA averaged 10 percent. Only in three of our focus countries -Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Ukraine -has agricultural production assisted less than nonagricultural tradables (RRA<0) during the present decade. And in virtually all countries for which there is a time series, the RRA is higher at the end of our sample period than in the first few years of transition (figure 5).
Implications and Conclusions
Clearly, reforms have brought major changes in distortions to agricultural incentives and their effects over the past two decades in the transition countries of Europe. While incentives were massively distorted under the Communist system, market liberalizations have reduced distortions to agricultural incentives in the region, and in many of the countries average protection levels are now relatively low. which the large farm lobby fell out with President Kuchma, who consequently introduced a series of important reforms which farmers had successfully opposed previously.
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While average protection rates are relatively low, there is still considerable variation among countries within the region. Specifically, for this region as elsewhere, farmer assistance tends to be higher in higher-income countries, and in countries with weaker comparative advantage in agriculture. 12 Hence it is likely that similar political-economic interactions and mechanisms are at work in this region as in other parts of the world.
One important factor affecting the choice of agricultural policies, in particular in the CEECs, was the preparation for joining the EU and its Common Agricultural Policy. The EU accession process encouraged CEE governments to target the levels of support expected in the EU by the end of the phase-in period of accession, so as to maximize the transfer of benefits from Brussels. However, it appears that in the years before accession the EU 11 It should be noted though that democratic political change is not a sufficient condition in itself for better agricultural policies. For example, in both Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic, their political changes (the "Orange Revolution" and the "Tulip Revolution", respectively) have not contributed to better agricultural policy. In fact the Ukraine government seems to have somewhat reversed its reform process, while change in the Kyrgyz Republic mostly resulted in more instability even though relatively few distortions remain in agriculture there. 12 The positive correlation between a country's per capita income and agricultural protection is one of the wellknown stylized facts of the political economy of agricultural policies -for reasons explained in, for example, Anderson and Hayami (1986) , Anderson (1995) , Swinnen (1994) and de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) .
accession process had more impact on the introduction of new support instruments than on the overall level of support, probably because all the cost of that support had to be borne within the national economy prior to EU accession (Swinnen 2002 ).
The increases in agricultural support in the CEECs in the second half of the 1990s and more recently in the CIS are the result of interactions between domestic political forces and international events. The increase in farmer assistance in CEE countries in the late 1990s was likely caused by the 'normal' domestic internal pressures that are brought to bear in a contestable political environment which result in rises in agricultural protectionism as per capita income increases and as agricultural comparative advantage declines. In the CEE case it was probably a case of reversing somewhat the overshooting in reform during the first few years of transition.
After accession, the CEE countries that joined have gradually raised agricultural assistance towards EU-15 levels. An important part of the EU farm subsidies are now under the form of direct payments. The CEE countries have been induced also to undertake major regulatory improvements to stimulate their markets, including private investments in the food chain and public rural infrastructure investments. Their trade policies have likewise changed so as to allow free access for all products from other EU-27 member countries and, in most cases, also freer access for non-agricultural products from non-EU countries (the latter because the common external tariff typically was lower than that previously applying in acceding countries). Interestingly, the impact of the EU accession process on consumer food prices in the CEE countries was much lower than expected. The main reason is the increased competition in the CEECs with the full opening of agri-food markets to imports, and with the massive inflow of foreign direct investment in the retail supermarket sector.
Further east, there was a significant increase in CIS farm assistance after 2000. This increase was stimulated by improvements in governments' budgetary situation, which allowed more subsidies to be given to farmers than was possible in the early years of transition. This factor has played a role throughout the transition region, but in particular in Russia and some of its neighbors where recovery from the post-1998 fiscal crisis was aided by windfall gains from the dramatic rise in the prices of their exports of energy raw materials.
This factor was stronger in those countries where governments have more access to mineral resources, such as in Russia (oil and gas), Kazakhstan (oil), and Turkmenistan (gas).
While distortions to agricultural incentives have been reduced substantially in the transition region, there is still substantial room for further reduction of distortions. This could be done through various means: overall reductions in support, shifting support to lessdistortive policy instruments, and focusing budgetary expenditures on public good investments (in infrastructure and institutions to reduce trade costs and raise farm productivity) rather than on farm subsidies, shifting from a quantity-based to a quality-based policy paradigm, and so forth.
The accession of the CEE countries to the EU has increased their levels of farm assistance, although they now face more competition within the enlarged EU. While reducing CEE farm assistance in the future will not happen without reductions in EU support levels, some reforms have been introduced in the EU (e.g., the cut in EU sugar price support and the shift from per hectare payments to single farm payments). These reforms have mostly reduced the market-distorting effects of assistance while the level of assistance has remained more or less constant.
Those countries which aspire to join the EU in the medium or long term should focus their policy attention in the near term on efficiency improvements in both their policies and their agricultural economies. This is consistent with the objective of EU accession, since the EU itself has moved in recent years to more-decoupled farm support and is demanding that member countries move in that direction and improve the efficiency of their farms and food companies.
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The same policy framework should be promoted in countries further east, which include countries that have started to spend more funds on agriculture as their fiscal situation improved -although this may be reversed in the current financial crisis. Increased funding should be focused on upgrading infrastructure, on quality and efficiency of the agri-food system, and on the introduction or improvements of a variety of institutions necessary to support rural markets. In several of the poorer and the larger CIS countries, institutional and infrastructure problems, as well as corruption, remain major constraints to trade and thereby distort farm incentives.
Competition and anti-trust policy is an important related area for policy attention. In supply chains where farms have to sell their products to trading, processing, and retailing companies, the ability to choose freely between companies is of crucial importance in getting better conditions for farms. This applies across the region where monopoly buyers (stateowned or private) push down prices and contract conditions. However, the sources of anticompetitive behavior and policy details are likely to differ, for example between the increasing dominance of large retail chains in Central Europe versus some of the government controlled cotton chains in Central Asia.
In terms of further reductions in policy distortions, one of the most distortive situations that still requires attention is the taxation of agriculture, such as through the control and rent extraction in the cotton sectors in some Central Asian countries. In Uzbekistan, Removing those distortions would allow a substantial improvement in incentives to domestic producers. For example, cotton farmers have responded sharply to the differences in price distortions, both in area and output: rapid growth in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic contrasts with declines or stagnation in the other countries. Some progress has been made in recent years, but much more can be done.
14 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan governments use state monopoly powers over marketing to transfer substantial resources out of agriculture. Most of the transfers in Uzbekistan appear to go to general government revenue, whereas in Turkmenistan much is wasted (e.g., in inefficient cotton mills with negative value added) or accrues to secret accounts under the President's personal control. Moreover, recently some potentially important reforms have been introduced in Uzbekistan to reduce some of the distortions to farm incentives, while almost none have taken place in Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan the rent distribution is more opaque, but equally detrimental to farms, as a coalition between the government and a monopolistic private trading company has caused depressed prices and incentives for farmers. Price and trade data are not sufficiently reliable to allow NRA calculations, but Pomfret (2008a,b) and Christensen and Pomfret (2008) provide considerable qualitative information supporting the claims above.
Our final comments are on the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 15 The impact of the WTO on (changes in) agricultural distortions has varied strongly between countries. WTO accession has not strongly disciplined transition countries that were founding members in 1995 (Bacchetta and Drabek 2002) . 16 For the CEECs, most of whom were original members of the WTO, the most important WTO impact has been indirect: in anticipation of eastward enlargement, the EU was forced to introduce major changes to its
Common Agricultural Policy, which in turn has affected post-accession agricultural distortions in the CEECs.
For transition countries that had to negotiate their entry in the latter 1990s, the constraints on introducing or maintaining distortions are more serious. And for those large transition countries still in the process of negotiating their accession, notably Russia and Kazakhstan, the WTO membership has been even tougher in their demands. Whether that latter stance will prove an agricultural trade-liberalizing force remains to be seen, but at least it will provide a ceiling on the extent to which agricultural protection and subsidies may be raised in the future. Source: , updated from estimates reported in Anderson and Swinnen (2008) . Source: , updated from estimates reported in Anderson and Swinnen (2008 a. Weighted average for each country, including product-specific output and input distortions and non-product-specific assistance as well as authors' guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices.
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 13 countries of their national NRA (production-weighted) average NRAs.
c. Dispersion is a simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the national agricultural sector NRAs. and for EU-27 in 2007, such that the differences across CEE countries is due to differing national product weights. Source: updated from estimates reported in Anderson and Swinnen (2008) .
a. Region's weighted average for each product and for All covered products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices.
b. Dispersion is the standard deviation shown is the simple 4-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. 
